INTENT

intent. 1. The state of mind accompanying an act, esp. a forbidden act. • While motive is the inducement to do some act, intent is the mental resolution or determination to do it. When the intent to do an act that violates the law exists, motive becomes immaterial. Cf. MOTIVE; SCIENTER.

“The phrase ‘with intent to,’ or its equivalents, may mean any one of at least four different things: — (1) That the intent referred to must be the sole or exclusive intent; (2) that it is sufficient if it is one of several concurrent intents; (3) that it must be the chief or dominant intent, any others being subordinate or incidental; (4) that it must be a determining intent, that is to say, an intent in the absence of which the act would not have been done, the remaining purposes being insufficient motives by themselves. It is a question of construction which of those meanings is the true one in the particular case.” John Salmond, Jurisprudence 383–84 (Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947).

constructive intent.A legal principle that actual intent will be presumed when an act leading

to the result could have been reasonably expected to cause that result.

“Constructive intent is a fiction which permits lip service to the notion that intention is essential to criminality, while recognizing that unintended consequences of an act may sometimes be sufficient for guilt of some offenses.” Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law

835 (3d ed. 1982).

criminal intent. 1.MENS REA. 2. An intent to commit an actus reus without any justification, excuse, or other defense. — Also termed felonious intent. See specific intent. [Cases: Criminal Law 20. C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 31–33, 35–39; Negligence § 913.]

“The phrase ‘criminal intent’ is one that has been bandied about with various meanings not carefully distinguished. At times it has been used in the sense of the ‘intent to do wrong’ (the outline of the mental pattern which is necessary for crime in general), — as, for example, in the phrase ‘the mental element commonly called criminal intent.’ At times it has been used in the sense of mens rea as the mental element requisite for guilt of the very offense charged, ‘a varying state of mind which is the contrary of an innocent state of mind, whatever may be pointed out by the nature of the crime as an innocent state of mind.’ Often it is used to include criminal negligence as well as an actual intent to do the harmful deed, although at other times such negligence is referred to as a substitute, so to speak, for criminal intent in connection with certain offenses. Occasionally it is found in the sense of an intent to violate the law, — implying a knowledge of the law violated. On the other hand, as such knowledge is a factor not ordinarily required for conviction it has been pointed out that to establish ignorance of the law does not disprove criminal intent. Thus it has been said (assuming the absence of any circumstance of exculpation) ‘whenever an act is criminal, the party doing the act is chargeable with criminal intent.’ … This suggests a helpful guide for the use of the phrase ‘criminal intent.’ Some other term such as mens rea or guilty mind should be employed for more general purposes, and ‘criminal intent’ be restricted to those situations in which there is (1) an intent to do the actus reus, and (2) no circumstance of exculpation.” Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 832–34 (3d ed. 1982).

donative intent.The intent to surrender dominion and control over the gift that is being made. felonious intent.See criminal intent.

general intent.The intent to perform an act even though the actor does not desire the consequences that result. • This is the state of mind required for the commission of certain common-law crimes not requiring a specific intent or not imposing strict liability. General intent usu. takes the form of recklessness (involving actual awareness of a risk and the culpable taking of that risk) or negligence (involving blameworthy inadvertence). — Also termed general criminal intent; general mens rea. [Cases: Criminal Law 20, 23. C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 31–33, 35–39;

Negligence §§ 913–914.]

immediate intent.The intent relating to a wrongful act; the part of the total intent coincident

with the wrongful act itself.

implied intent.A person’s state of mind that can be inferred from speech or conduct, or from

language used in an instrument to which the person is a party.

intent to kill.An intent to cause the death of another; esp., a state of mind that, if found to exist during an assault, can serve as the basis for an aggravated-assault charge. [Cases: Assault and

Battery 49; Homicide 526. C.J.S. Assault and Battery §§ 67, 71.]

larcenous intent.A state of mind existing when a person (1) knowingly takes away the goods of another without any claim or pretense of a right to do so, and (2) intends to permanently deprive the owner of them or to convert the goods to personal use. See LARCENY. [Cases:

Larceny 3. C.J.S. Larceny §§ 25–29.]

manifest intent.Intent that is apparent or obvious based on the available circumstantial evidence, even if direct evidence of intent is not available. • For example, some fidelity bonds cover an employer’s losses caused by an employee’s dishonest or fraudulent acts committed with a manifest intent to cause a loss to the employer and to obtain a benefit for the employee. Establishing manifest intent sufficient to trigger coverage does not require direct evidence that the employee intended the employer’s loss. Even if the employee did not actively want that result, but the result was substantially certain to follow from the employee’s conduct, the requisite intent will be inferred.

predatory intent.Antitrust. A business’s intent to injure a competitor by unfair means, esp. by sacrificing revenues to drive a competitor out of business. [Cases: Monopolies 12(1.6). C.J.S.

Monopolies §§ 32, 40–42, 48, 52, 54, 65, 69, 72–73.]

specific intent.The intent to accomplish the precise criminal act that one is later charged with. • At common law, the specific-intent crimes were robbery, assault, larceny, burglary, forgery, false pretenses, embezzlement, attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy. — Also termed criminal intent. See SPECIFIC-INTENT DEFENSE. [Cases: Criminal Law 20. Criminal Law §§ 31–33, 35–39;

Negligence § 913.]

testamentary intent.A testator’s intent that a particular instrument function as his or her last will and testament. • Testamentary intent is required for a will to be valid. [Cases: Wills 438.

C.J.S. Wills § 831.]

transferred intent.Intent that has been shifted from the originally intended wrongful act to the wrongful act actually committed. • For example, if a person intends to kill one person but kills another, the intent may be transferred to the actual act. See TRANSFERRED-INTENT

DOCTRINE. [Cases: Criminal Law 25; Homicide 555, 702, 731. C.J.S. Criminal Law § 43.]

ulterior intent.The intent that passes beyond a wrongful act and relates to the objective for the sake of which the act is done; MOTIVE. • For example, a thief’s immediate intent may be to steal another’s money, but the ulterior intent may be to buy food with that money.

2. A lawmaker’s state of mind and purpose in drafting or voting for a measure. [Cases:

Statutes 181(1), 184. C.J.S. Statutes §§ 315–316.] legislative intent.See LEGISLATIVE INTENT.

original intent.The mental state of the drafters or enactors of the U.S. Constitution, a statute,

or another document.

[Blacks Law 8th]